Justices To Decide The Application Of “Knowingly” In 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) And To Address The Definition Of Generic Burglary
In Rehaif, the question presented is whether the “knowingly” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) – the default penalty provision for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) – applies to both the possession and status elements of a § 922(g) crime, as has been urged by then-Judge, now Justice Gorsuch, or whether it applies only to the possession element, as has been held by the courts.
In Quarles, the issue is whether the definition of generic burglary in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), requires proof that intent to commit a crime was present at the time of unlawful entry or first unlawful remaining, as two circuits hold; or whether it is enough that the defendant formed the intent to commit a crime at any time while “remaining in” the building or structure, as the lower court and three other circuits hold.
The certiorari stage filings in Rehaif are available on the Supreme Court’s website here. The Eleventh Circuit’s opinions – initial and revised opinions – are reported at United States v. Rehaif, 868 F.3d 907 (11th Cir. 2017)(original opinion) and United States v. Rehaif, 888 F.3d 1138 (11th Cir. 2018)(revised opinion) and are also in the appendix of the petition, available here. The certiorari stage filings in Quarles are available on the Supreme Court’s website here. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion is reported at United States v. Quarles, 850 F.3d 836 (6th Cir. 2017) and is available here. The Training Division provides sentencing resources specifically on firearm offenses and enhancements for crimes of violence and violent felonies to help you argue for the best possible sentence for your client.