Pretrial Release

And

Detention

Geoffrey A. Hansen

Chief Assistant Federal Public Defender

450 Golden Gate Avenue

San Francisco, CA 94102

Telephone: (415) 436-7700

Geoffrey A. Hansen November 2001

Chief Assistant Federal Public Defender

450 Golden Gate Ave

San Francisco, CA 94102

Telephone: (415) 436-7700

PRETRIAL RELEASE AND DETENTION

I. Nature of Right To Be Released Pretrial

See U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); U.S. v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981).

II. Purpose of the Act

A. Primary purpose to de‑emphasize use of money bonds and to provide flexible alternatives to judges setting high bail.

B. Act further intended to eliminate practice of detaining dangerous defendants by setting of high bail. 18 U.S.C. ' 3142(c)(2).

U.S. v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 890 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Act prohibits using high financial conditions to detain defendants); see U.S. v. Badalamenti, 810 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1987); U.S. v. Holloway, 781 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1986).

C. Thus, the Act (18 U.S.C. ' 3142(b)) expressly provides that a defendant shall be released on OR or PR unless;

1. defendant represents a serious flight risk; or

2. defendant presents a danger to the community.

Notes

‑ Court cannot detain merely if it determines that OR or PR will not prevent flight or danger to community; it must nonetheless consider other conditions. Orta, 760 F.2d at 890; 18 U.S.C. ' 3142(a).

‑ Bad legislative history; Congress suggests if court believes monetary amount is necessary to ensure appearance and defendant cannot meet that amount, court may detain defendant. See U.S. v. Gotay, 609 F. Supp. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); U.S. v. Mantecon-Zayas, 949 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1991).

‑ Some courts have held that a court need not set bail in an amount defendant can easily make and may maintain financial conditions even if it results in detention. U.S. v. Szott, 768 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Westbrook, 780 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1986) (may maintain financial conditions and order detention only if no other conditions will assure defendant's presence); U.S. v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1988). See U.S. v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Wong‑Alvarez, 779 F.2d 583 (11th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Gotay, 609 F.Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); U.S. v. Lemos, 876 F.Supp. 58 (D.N.J. 1995); U.S. v. Penaranda, 2001 WL 125621 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)(can impose fin. conditions, but court orders bond reduction when def. cannot meet original conditions).

‑ Unclear who must shoulder burden of proving financial conditions cannot be met. Szott suggests defendant has burden, although it does not define burden and merely holds that a bare affidavit claiming lack of ability to meet financial conditions insufficient. U.S. v. Szott, 768 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1985).

‑ If defendant cannot meet financial conditions and appeals to district court, district court can order detention. U.S. v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

‑ If property is used to secure bond, government can't require property be unencumbered. U.S. v. Frazier, 772 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1985).

‑ Some courts have expressed concerns about court policies re: property bonds if the policies prevent release. See U.S. v. Price, 773 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1985).

- Government can obtain hearing on source of funds. ' 3142(g)(4).

III. Procedural Aspects of the Act

A. Timing of Request for Detention

1. Government must request the defendant's detention at initial appearance. 18 U.S.C. ' 3142(f).

U.S. v. Payden, 759 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1985); U.S. v. O'Shaughnessy, 764 F.2d 1035, vacated on reh'g as moot, 772 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Holloway, 781 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1986); see U.S. v. Al‑Azzawy, 768 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1985). But see U.S. v. King, 818 F.2d 112 (1st Cir. 1987)(first appearance requirement subject to harmless error standard and is not to be interpreted overly literally); U.S. v. Medina, 775 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1985) (delayed motion construed as motion to revoke release).

2. Court may reopen hearing if newly discovered evidence comes to Court's attention. 18 U.S.C. ' 3142(f).

- New evidence, if proffered by Government, must not have been available at first hearing. U.S. v. Flores, 856 F.Supp. 1400 (E.D. Cal. 1994); see U.S. v. Holloway, 781 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1986) (new evidence must be exceptional to justify new detention hearing); U.S. v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1989) (court refuses to reopen hearing to allow family to testify ‑ not new evidence). Accord

U.S. v.  Dillion, 938 F.2d 1412 (lst Cir. 1991).

Notes

- Entire issue of time requirements brought into question by

U.S. v. Montalvo - Murillo, 110 S.Ct. 2072 (1990).

‑ If defendant not represented at initial appearance, court may order hearing within five days. U.S. v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1985).

‑ District court may order detention hearing at initial appearance of defendant before it even if no request for detention made before magistrate. U.S. v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

- District court may revoke release even without Government request. U.S. v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1991).

‑ If defendant is arrested out of district or initially appears before a magistrate and case is transferred to another magistrate, "initial appearance" is when defendant appears in charging district. U.S. v. Melendez‑Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986);

U.S. v. Valenzuela‑Verdigo, 815 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1987);

U.S. v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1986); U.S. v. Medina,

775 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1985).

- Defendant entitled to bail hearing in arresting district even if charging district issues no bail warrant. U.S. v. Thomas, 992 F.Supp. 782 (D. Virgin Is. 1998).

B. Grounds for request. 18 U.S.C. ' 3142(f).

1. Government believes person poses a serious flight risk.

2. Government believes defendant will threaten witnesses, etc.

3. Person is charged with:

a) a crime of "violence," which is defined by 18 U.S.C.

' 3156(a)(4) as:

(A) an offense that has as an element of the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another;

(B) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense; or

(C) any felony charged under sexual abuse or abuse of children statutes.

b) an offense involving death penalty or life imprisonment;

c) a drug offense involving penalty of ten years or more; or

d) any felony after defendant has committed two or more crimes of violence or drug offenses.

Notes

- Some issue whether "crime of violence" is to be determined by looking at nature of crime or by facts of commission. See

U.S. v. Hardon, 6 F.Supp.2d 673 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (categorical); U.S. v. Epps, 987 F.Supp. 22 (D.C.C. 1997)(facts); U.S. v. Carter, 996 F.Supp. 260 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)(categorical).

- Conspiracy to commit a violent crime probably qualifies.

U.S. v. Mitchell, 23 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994).

‑ To obtain detention, government must charge defendant with crime of violence. See U.S. v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Carswell, 144 F.Supp.2d 123 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). Contra U.S. v. Bess, 678 F.Supp. 929 (D.D.C. 1988). See U.S. v. Byrd, 969 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1992) (case must involve violence);

- Possession of gun alone may not be crime of violence under ' 3142. See U.S. v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1999)(and cases cited therein); U.S. v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2001): U.S. v. Francis, 2001 WL 899635 (S.D. Ind. 2001). Contra, U.S. v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Lee, 156 F.Supp.2d 620 (E.D.La. 2001); U.S. v. Cruickshank, 150 F.Supp.2d 1112 (D.Col. 2001);

U.S. v. Spry, 76 F.Supp.2d 719 (S.D. W.Va. 1999).

‑ Unless defendant will intimidate witnesses or is a flight risk, detention not available if defendant charged with economic crime; must be crime identified above. U.S. v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1986). Accord U.S. v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1988);

U.S. v. Simon, 760 F. Supp. 495 (D.Vir.Is. 1990). However, defendant can be ordered as part of release order to stop activities which pose economic danger. U.S. v. Harris, 920 F. Supp. 132 (D.Nev. 1996).

‑ Danger alleged by the government must relate to federal case ‑ unrelated allegation of danger to others insufficient. U.S. v. Ploof, 851 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Byrd, 969 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1992).

- Prior arrests, not resulting in convictions, insufficient ground to base danger to community finding. U.S. v. Leyba, 104 F.Supp.2d 1182, 1184 n.2 (S.D. Iowa 2000).

- Refusal to accept jurisdiction of court and generally making threats against others sufficient ground for detention. U.S. v. Ippolito, 930 F. Supp. 581 (M.D.Fla. 1996).

- Juvenile adjudications not Aprior convictions.@ U.S. v. Silva, 133 F.Supp.2d 104 (D.Mass. 2001).

C. If request for detention is made by government, court shall order defendant detained until hearing is held. 18 U.S.C. ' 3142(f); however, once hearing begins, court may release defendant. Id.

D. Continuance for hearing.

1. Temporary detention (18 U.S.C. ' 3142(d)). Ten‑day continuance allowed if the defendant:

a) at time of offense, was on bail for a felony charge;

b) is awaiting sentencing on any charge;

c) is on parole or probation; or

d) is an illegal alien;

AND

e) the person poses a flight risk or danger to community.

Notes

‑ Unclear what burden is placed upon government to secure this continuance. See U.S. v. Buck, 609 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

‑ Ninth Circuit has held that ten‑day continuance may not be used by the government as subterfuge to delay hearing. U.S. v. Al‑Azzawy, 768 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1985).

‑ Burden on defendant to show citizenship. 18 U.S.C. ' 3142(d).

2. Absent temporary detention, government may only have three days, defendant can obtain five‑day continuance. 18 U.S.C. ' 3142(f).

Notes

‑ Weekends and holidays not included.

‑ Unclear whether government may get three days in addition to ten days provided by temporary detention. U.S. v. Al‑Azzawy, 768 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1985) (suggests three days improper after ten‑day delay); U.S. v. Lee, 783 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1986) (ten‑day request tolls time for a section 3142(f) hearing); U.S. v. Vargas, 804 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1986) (Gov. can request perm. detention anytime during ten‑day temp. detention);

U.S. v. Becerra‑Cobo, 790 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1986) (same); U.S. v. Alatishe, 768 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same);

U.S. v. Moncado‑Pelaez, 810 F.2d 1008 (11th Cir. 1987);

U.S. v. Daniels, 622 F. Supp. 178 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (if ten‑day temporary properly requested, government can later seek ' 3142(f) detention).

‑ Unclear whether three‑day continuance request by government requires some justification; statute seemingly makes granting of request automatic. 18 U.S.C. ' 3142(f); U.S. v. Lee, 783 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1986).

- During continuance, defendant "shall be detained." Also def. can be examined to determine narcotics addiction. ' 3142(f)(2)(B).

‑ Further continuance virtually impossible to grant; must be based upon "good cause." U.S. v. Al‑Azzawy, 768 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1985) (defendant may not waive time; attorney conflicts are insufficient cause for continuance; court may not continue on its own motion);

U.S. v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1985) (convenience of court, attorney not good cause). But see U.S. v. Coonan, 826 F.2d 1180 (2d Cir. 1987) (five‑day rule not mandatory when defendant in state custody); U.S. v. King, 818 F.2d 112 (1st Cir. 1987) (defendant's counsel can waive time limits - rule of reason applicable); U.S. v. Clark, 865 F.2d 1433 (4th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (same); U.S. v. Melendez‑Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986) (continuance permitted to obtain witnesses).

‑ No remedy for violation of time limits - Government is still free to seek detention. U.S. v. Montalvo-Murillo, 110 S.Ct. 2072 (1990).

IV. The Detention Hearing. 18 U.S.C. ' 3142(f).

A. Standard for detention.

1. Flight risk by preponderance of evidence.

2. Danger to community by clear and convincing evidence.

U.S. v. Vortis, 785 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1986); U.S. v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc);

U.S. v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1985).

Notes

‑ Court need not find that defendant poses both flight risk and danger. U.S. v. Askari, 608 F. Supp. 1045 (E.D. Pa. 1985).

- Defendant need not show that release conditions will be equivalent of jail; only need conditions that will reasonably assure defendant's presence. See Kin-Hong v. U.S., 926 F. Supp. 1180 (D.Mass. 1996).

- Clear and convincing evidence means proof that particular defendant actually poses a danger, not that defendant in theory poses a danger.

U.S. v. Patriarca, 948 F.2d 789 (1st Cir. 1991).

B. Presumptions. 18 U.S.C. ' 3142(e).

1. Rebuttable presumption that defendant shall be detained if:

a) defendant has been convicted of violent crime, capital offense, drug offense, or any felony after committing two violent crimes/drug offenses;

AND

b) offense was committed while defendant was on bail;

AND

c) less than five years from conviction date/release date for offense described in a. above;

OR

d) court has probable cause to believe that defendant has committed drug offense with penalty of ten years or more or is subject to prosecution under 18 U.S.C ' 924(c), ' 956(a), or ' 2332(b).

Notes

‑ Presumption does not apply unless defendant is charged with drug, gun, or sexual abuse offense. U.S. v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Shaker, 665 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (arson not presumption crime).

‑ Presumption in drug offense arguably intended to prevent flight. See generally U.S. v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 395‑98 (1st Cir. 1985) (remarks from hearings on Bail Reform Act).

‑ Single drug charge must exceed ten‑year limit; cannot aggregate charges. U.S. v. Hinote, 789 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986).

2. Indictment alone represents probable cause.

U.S. v. Vargas, 804 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1986); U.S. v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Suppa, 799 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1986);

U.S. v. Trosper, 809 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1987); U.S. v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1986); U.S. v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1985).

3. Manner of establishing probable cause absent indictment.

Hearsay permissible provided court finds information reliable. U.S. v. Acevedo‑Ramos, 755 F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); U.S. v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1985); But see U.S. v. Suppa, 799 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1986) (court expresses doubt that probable cause can be established by proffer);

U.S. v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390 (3d Cir. 1985) (admission of hearsay discretionary); U.S. v. Jeffries, 679 F.Supp. 1114 (M.D.Ga. 1988) (court must establish reliability of hearsay evid.).

Note

‑ In addition to showing probable cause that defendant committed an offense involving the presumption, the defendant must be charged with such an offense as well. U.S. v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1985). Contra U.S. v. Bess, 678 F.Supp.929 (D.D.C. 1988).

C. Effect of presumption.

1. If presumption is invoked, defendant need only present some credible evidence showing defendant is not flight risk or danger to the community, e.g., defendant has burden of production only.

U.S. v. Alatishe, 768 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986); U.S. v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1985);

U.S. v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. Cal. 1985); U.S. v. Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. Cal. 1985).

Notes

‑ Can use pretrial services report as "some credible evidence." See

U.S. v. Nicholas, 681 F.Supp. 527 (N.D.Ill. 1988) (uncorr. evid. re: background rebuts presump; but bad looks at pros. represents a danger); U.S. v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1989) (court suggests that pretrial service report may rebut presumption).

- Use of electronic bracelet "arguably" rebuts presumption.

U.S. v. O'Brien, 895 F.2d 810 (lst Cir. 1990); see Kin-Hong v. U.S.,

926 F. Supp. 1180 (D.Mass. 1996); U.S. v. Leyba, 104 F.Supp. 2d 1182 (S. D. Iowa 2000).

- Can introduce evidence of polygraph to try to rebut presumption.

U.S. v. Bellomo, 944 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. N.Y. 1996).

- Can argue cross-examination of Gov. witnesses may rebut presumption. U.S. v. Gourley, 936 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Tex. 1996).

- Evidence that def. was not "typical" drug dealer rebutts presumption. U.S. v. Giampo, 755 F. Supp. 665 (W.D.Pa. 1990).

‑ Jessup and Fortna hold that some credible evidence does not eliminate presumption; it still may be considered by court. See U.S. v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1987).

2. If presumption is unrebutted, unclear whether detention mandated.

U.S. v. Volksen, 766 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1985) (unrebutted presumption enough); U.S. v. Alatishe, 768 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same);

U.S. v. Suppa, 799 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); U.S. v. Kouyoumdjian, 601 F. Supp. 1506 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (unrebutted presumption justified detention); U.S. v. Maktabi, 601 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (unrebutted presumption enough).

But see U.S. v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1986) (can't detain on presumption alone unless there is proof of future dangerousness); see

U.S. v. Jackson, 845 F.2d 1262 (5th Cir. 1988) (excellent decision holding presumption and general allegations of danger insufficient);

U.S. v. Cox, 635 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Kan. 1986) (unrebutted presumption not enough); U.S. v. Jones, 614 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (defendant did not rebut presumption, but government failed to show clear and convincing evidence of danger); U.S. v. Jeffries, 679 F.Supp. 1114 (M.D.Ga 1988) (Government cannot rely on indictment alone; guns and drug charges not necessarily enough), U.S.  v. Bell, 673 F.Supp. 1429 (E.D.Mich. 1987) (hearsay may not satisfy clear/convincing evidence); U.S. v. Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (clear and convincing standard remains even when presumption exists).

Notes

‑ Some courts have held hearsay may be enough to establish probable cause, but may not be sufficient to carry burden.

U.S. v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1442 (N.D. Ill. 1984).

D. Factors to be considered at detention hearing. 18 U.S.C. ' 3142(g).

1. Nature of offense, including whether offense is violent or involves a narcotic drug. See U.S. v. Yeaple, 605 F. Supp. 85 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (visual depiction of minors engaged in sexual conduct form of violence). U.S. v. Simon, 760 F.Supp. 495 (D.Vir.Is. 1990) (jury tampering not dangerous crime).

2. Weight of evidence.

Ninth Circuit holds that this is the least important factor because court cannot make pretrial determination of guilt. U.S. v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1985).

3. History of defendant/characteristics.

4. Mental/financial/family ties/employment/criminal history/record of appearances/medical status.

See U.S. v. Scarpa, 815 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (def. with AIDS could be released to hospital if def. paid for care and for Marshal to guard him).

Request for psychiatric exam re: insanity defense not ground for revocation of release. U.S. v. Gomez-Borges, 91 F.Supp.2d 477 (D. Puerto Rico 2000).

U.S. v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1986) (can't rely on past indications of dangerousness alone).

Foreign nationality not necessarily enough to indicate flight risk.

U.S. v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1985); See U.S. v. Paterson, 780 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1986); U.S. v. Townsend, 897 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1990).

Pending INS detainer does not deprive court of ability to consider release. U.S. v. Adomako, 150 F.Supp.2d 1302 (M.D. Fla. 2001).

"Ties to community" means both community of arrest and community where defendant normally resides. U.S. v. Townsend, 897 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1990).

Crt. must hear testimony of family members if def. asks to present witnesses. U.S. v. Torres, 929 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1991).

5. Probation/parole status.

6. Nature of danger posed to community if defendant is released.

See U.S. v. Yeaple, 605 F. Supp. 85 (M.D. Pa. 1985)(possession of material involving minors poses threat to community); U.S. v. Cocco, 604 F. Supp. 1060 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (same). Contra U.S. v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Byrd, 969 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1992).

U.S. v. Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489 (N.D.Cal.1985) ("compelling" evidence that defendant committed drug offense insufficient to show danger to community).

7. Amount of time before trial commences.

See U.S. v. Gelfuso, 838 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1988)(Due Process requires case‑by‑case analysis); accord, U.S. v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1989). U.S. v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1985) (may be a factor); accord U.S. v. Rios, 846 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1988). U.S. v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1987)(examine defendant's involvement in continuances); see U.S. v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510 (10th Cir. 1986); U.S. v. LoFranco, 620 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D.N.Y. 1985); U.S. v. Acceturro, 783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1986); U.S. v. Gato, 750 F.Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1990) (Crt. orders release of defendants because of excessive delay). But see U.S. v. Melendez‑Carrion, 820 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1987) (19 month detention OK); U.S. v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986) (extended detention does not require release). U.S. v. Quartermaine, 913 F.2d 910 (11th Cir. 1990) (10 month delay OK).

E. Hearing procedure. 18 U.S.C. ' 3142(f).

1. Defendant may testify, present information, present witnesses, cross‑examine witnesses who appear.

See U.S. v. Davis, 845 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1988) (defendant entitled to hearing and to testify; cannot order detention on government allegations alone).

2. Ability of defendant to receive discovery under Rule 16, Brady material, and to issue subpoenas subject to discretion of court. U.S. v. Lewis, 769 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Kan. 1991).

3. Either government or defendant can present information by proffer or through hearsay, as rules of evidence do not apply.

U.S. v. Lafontaine, 210 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Smith, 79 F.3d 1208 (D. C. Cir. 1996); U.S. v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1986) (government can use proffers); U.S. v. Cardenas, 784 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1986); See generally U.S. v. Acevedo‑Ramos, 755 F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1985) (use of hearsay). But see U.S. v. Hammond, 44 F.Supp.2d 743 (D.Md. 1999) (Gov. proffer may be insufficient; court can order live testimony); U.S. v. Cabrera-Ortigoza, 2000 WL 1585081 (S. D. Cal. 2000) (court can order witnesses to appear).

Notes

- Crime Act of 1994 allows victim in sex cases to be heard re: danger.

- Good language re: fact that hearing should be meaningful.

U.S. v. Hernandez, 747 Supp. 846 (D.P.R. 1990).

‑ Evidence of danger should involve quantifiable, objective evidence. U.S. v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985).

‑ Hearsay may be insufficient for government to carry burden. (See above).

‑ Illegally seized evidence can be admitted at detention hearing.

U.S. v. Viers, 637 F. Supp. 1343 (W.D. Ky. 1986); See U.S. v. Angiulo, 755 F.2d 969 (1st Cir. 1985) (court can use electronic surveillance evidence even if defendant challenges legality).

‑ Factual representations of counsel are inadmissible. U.S. v. Yeaple, 605 F. Supp. 85, 87 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (nature of ruling here unclear).

‑ Defendant apparently has right to call government agents who testified re: probable cause if they will testify about weight of evidence.

U.S. v. Hurtado</